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The observatton of a new type of perverse behavior of votmg rules-Brams and Ftshburn’s 
“no-show paradox”--led Mouhn to Introduce the Parttctpatton Axtom (PA) It requires that an 
elector’s failure to vote should never result m the election of a candtdate whom he/she prefers 
to the one elected tf he/she votes sincerely The present paper examines PA in the context of 
Condorcet-type conditions For a given quota q, 3 5 qs 1, the q-Core Condition (qCC) requires 
that whenever there exists a candidate such that no other candidate 1s preferred to him/her by 
a fraction of q or more of the voters, the elected candidate should have this property It 1s shown 
here that PA and qCC are consistent rff qz (m - 1)/m or tn 5 3, where m IS the number of can- 
didates. This essentially confirms a conjecture of Mouhn and extends hts original result for q = j 
1. Introduction 
It is common practice, on the eve of Election Day, to call upon the public to exer- 
cise their right and vote. The argument is that by voting one can sometimes influence 
the outcome and secure the election of a preferred candidate. It turns out, however, 
that some popular voting rules may give rise to situations where one’s vote results 
in the election of a less preferred candidate (compared to the outcome in case of 
abstention). Brams and Fishburn [l] pointed this out for the “plurality with run- 
off” rule, and coined the term “no-show paradox” to describe such situations. 
In this paper we continue an axiomatic treatment of this phenomenon, originated 
by Moulin [3]. He introduced the Participation Axiom, requiring a voting rule to 
never give rise to situations of the type described above. He proved that if the 
number of candidates is 4 or more, this axiom is inconsistent with the well-known 
majority principle of Condorcet. Here we replace the simple majority in Con- 
dorcet’s principle by a special majority, indicated by a required quota, and deter- 
mine the range of values of the quota for which this inconsistency persists. 
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2. Definitions and result 
We let N, the set of natural numbers, stand for the set of potential voters, and 
we let A = {~z,,az, . . .. a,>, a non-empty finite set, stand for the set of candidates. 
We let L denote the set of all linear orders on A (i.e., PE L if PcA xA is irreflex- 
rve, transitive and complete; IL1 =m!). We understand ~P!J as “candidate a is 
preferred to candidate b.” 
A profile PV=(P’),, V is an assignment of elements of L to the members of some 
non-empty finite subset V of M. Given a profile P” and Of WC V, we denote by 
P W the profile obtained by restriction of P” to IV. We let 9 denote the set of all 
profiles. 
A voflng rule IS a function f: @+A. We understand f(P “) = a as saying that 
when V is the set of participating voters and their preferences are expressed by 
(PI),, v then a is the elected candidate. 
A voting rule f satisfies the Partrcipatlon Axiom (PA) rf there do not exist I/c N 
with I< 1 I/( < 03, P”E B and IE V such that f(P”\{‘})P’F(P”). 
Let q be a real number, +rqr 1. We think of q as a quota, or more precisely 
as the majority size required to determine binary comparisons of candidates. In- 
deed, given P “E .9 we define a binary relation Dom(q, P”) on A by 
bDom(q,P”)a * I{~E V: bP’a}I 2 q/VI. 
We go on to define 
Core(q, P”) = {a E A: for no b E A does bDom(q, P “)a}. 
For a fixed q, a voting rule f satisfies the q-Core Condltron (qCC) is for all 
P”E@ 
Core(q, P “) # 0 * f(P “) E Core(q, P “). 
Finally, we say that two properties of voting rules are consistent if there exists a 
voting rule satisfying both properties. We are ready to state the result (as above, q 
is any quota in [+, 1] and m 1s the number of candidates). 
Theorem 2.1. PA and qCC are consistent lf and only if 
qz(m-1)/m or m53. 
In the special case q = 9, qCC becomes the classical Condorcet principle: if there 
exists a candidate who beats every other candidate by a majority (more than half) 
then this candidate should be elected. Mouhn [3] proved the result for this case 
(namely, PA and +CC are consistent iff m I 3) and conjectured that a result similar 
to Theorem 2.1 was true. 
The proof of the “only if” statement in Theorem 2.1 will be carried out first for 
a particular case (in the following section) and then in its general form in Section 
4. The “if” statement will be proved in Section 5. Further comments on the basic 
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formulation, the result and a related open problem will conclude the paper in Sec- 
tion 6. 
3. Illustration of inconsistency 
For the case m =4, the theorem asserts that PA and qCC are inconsistent 
whenever +sq<$. Here we shall prove that PA and *CC are inconsistent. Our 
purpose in doing this is to illustrate how an apparently sensible requirement like 
qCC can force a violation of PA, which may seem paradoxical. In addition, the 
general proof will be easier to understand with the particular case in mind. 
Consider a profile Pw described by: 
13 4 11 4 
al 02 a3 a4 
a2 a3 a4 aI 
a3 a4 al a2 
a4 al a2 a3 
This notation means that there are 13 voters with preference alPa2Pa3Pa4, 4 
voters with preference a2 Pa3 Pa4 Pa,, etc. Observe that the four different preferences 
are obtained by arranging the candidates in a cyclical order and breaking the cycle 
at each of the four possible places. The choice of the number of voters with each 
preference will be understood later. For definiteness, let IV= { 1,2, . . . ,32} with 
voters 1,2, . . . . 13 having the first preference, voters 14, 15, 16, 17 having the second 
preference, etc. 
We have 
bDom(+, PW)a iff 1 (itz W: bP’a} 1 z+ ~32 = 20. 
Thus 
al Dom(+, P W)azDom(%, P W)a3Dom(+, Pw)a4, 
but not a4Dom(+, Pw)al , since 4 + 1 1 + 4< 20. We conclude that 
Core@, Pw) = {al}. 
Now consider a profile P” 
preference a4 Pa, Pa3 Pa2 : 
13 4 11 4 4 
al a2 a3 a4 a4 
a2 a3 a4 aI ai 
a3 a4 a1 a2 a3 
a4 al a2 03 a2 
obtained by adding to Pw 4 new voters with 
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For defmrteness, let the new voters be 33, 34, 35, 36 and let V= (1,2, . . . . 36}. 
We have 
Thus 
but for no 
bDom($,P”)a iff 1 (I E V: W’a} 1 1% - 36 = 22.5. 
ajDom($, P ‘)a4Dom($, P ‘)a, Dom(9, Pv)a2, 
b does bDom($, Pv)a3. We conclude that 
Core(Q, P’) = {a3). 
Assume that f is a voting rule that satisfies both PA and *CC, and consider a 
sequence of profiles startmg with Pv and deleting the voters in V\ W one at a 
time, ending wtth Pw. By &CC, f(P’) = a3, and by PA at each step in the process 
the elected candidate can only move downward in the preference a4Pal Pa3Pgz. 
Yet, by QCC, f(P w, = al, which is a contradiction. 
4. Proof of inconsistency 
We shall prove here that PA and qCC are inconsistent whenever m14 and 
+ <q<(m - 1)/m. Together with Moulin’s result for q = 5, this will establish the 
“only if” statement in Theorem 2.1. We remark that our proof would break down 
for q = 9; this case genuinely requires a separate proof. 
Let m and q be given, m L 4 and 4 <q< (m - 1)/m. Consider a “profile” P w of 
the form: 
2q-1 2q-1 2q-1 
l-q+6 m2 l-q-6 m2 .*. - 
m-2 
al a2 a3 a4 ... a, 





: . : al : 
ad am aI a2 a,-2 
0, al 02 a3 .a, ad 
We have put the word profile in quotation marks because we only indicate the 
relative frequencies of the various preferences; furthermore, the indicated numbers 
may not be rational. Nevertheless, we shall consider the Dom relation and the Core 
for such “profiles”, as they are determined by the relative frequencies of 
preferences. The number 6 is positive and small, to be specified later. Notice that 
the indicated frequencies add up to 1 and, tf 6 is small enough, they are all positive. 
Since q < (m - 1)/m implies that 1 - (2q - l)/(m - 2) > q and 6 > 0, we have 
Core(q, Pw) = {al}. 
Now consider a “profile” Pv obtained by adding to Pw a number of new voters 
with amPal Pa3 Pa2 as part of their identical preference (the rest is immaterial). The 
To vote or not to vote 
relative frequencies in P” are 
137 
2q-1 2q-1 
AU-q+4, lm2’ w--q---6), A----&, - A2q-l 
m-2 
respectively for the preferences present in P”, and 1 -I for the new preference. 
The number I will be specified later (O<L < 1). 
If the following four inequalities hold, we shall have Core(q, P “) = {a3}. 




Indeed, (1) and (2) guarantee that a3czCore(q, P”), (3) implies that a,Dom(q, PV)al 
and (4) ensures that aJ_ I Dom(q, P”)a, for all j f 1,3. 
Suppose that we can choose 6 and 1 so that (l)-(4) are satisfied. Then we can con- 
struct actual profiles P WJ and P” approximating the mdicated relative frequencies, 
so that their respective Cores are {al} and (a3}= (Notice that all the inequalities 
above are strict, so rationality can be achieved.) Using P” and PW we can show 
that PA and qCC are inconsistent. 
Thus it suffices to show that 6 and A can be chosen appropriately. The conjunc- 
tion of (l)-(4) can be rewritten as 
1 
l-q 4 , 
max 2q-1 2q-1 1 
I 





q-I-6’ l-q+6 I- - 
For 6 = 0, the maximum on the left is less than 1 which is the minimum on the right. 
Hence for 6>0 small enough, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side, 
so 1 can be chosen in between. As this L will also satisfy O<L < 1, we are through. 
5. Proof of consistency 
We shall prove here that PA and qCC are consistent if q? (m - 1)/m or m 5 3. 
Assume that mr 3. For P”E 9, define f(P”) to be the first candidate in 
f14 Core(q, P 9, where the intersection ranges over those qE [+, l] for which 
Core(q, P “) # 0, and “first” refers to the fixed order aI, . . . , a,,, . It can be checked 
that f is well-defined and satisfies qCC for all q E [f, l]-this is true regardless of 
m-and moreover satisfies PA as well (this is actually shown in 131). 
Next, assume that qz (m - 1)/m. In order to define our voting rule in this case, 
we need some preliminaries. For P “E 9 and a E A we let 
w(P”,a) = I{(i,c): IE V, CEA and aP’c}I. 
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For P”E B we denote 
B(P”) = (aEA: @“,a) L w(P”,@ for all LEA}. 
The candidates in B(P “) are known as the Borda winners. The following definition 
of a voting rule g is meaningful for mr2. For P”E 9, define g(P”) to be the first 
candidate m 
B(P”) (3 Core((m - 1)/m, P”) 
if this intersection is non-empty, otherwise let g(P”) be the first candidate in 
B(P”). 
The satisfaction of PA follows immediately from the fact that g(P “) E B(P “) for 
all P”E 9. As for qCC, the basic observation is that if bDom(q, P”)a then 
w(P”, b) - w(P “, a) 
2 I{IE v: bP’a}I -(m-l)l{iE v: aP’b)I 
rqlI+(m-l)(l-q)lVI =(q-(m-l)/mjmIVI 10, 
and the last inequality is strict rf q> (m - 1)/m. Thus if q>(m - 1)/m then 
B(P”)CCore(q, P”) for all P”E 9 so g satisfies qCC. It remains to show that g 
satisfies qCC in the case q = (m - 1)/m. Assume it does not: let P”E B be such that 
Core((m - 1)/m, P”) # 0 
but 
g(P”) d Core((m - 1)/m, P”). 
By the defimtron of g it must be the case that 
B(P”) f7 Core((m - 1)/m, P “) = 0. 
Take an arbrtrary a E B(P “). Since 
a $ Core((m - 1)/m, P “), 
we can fmd b E A with 
bDom((m - 1)/m, P”)a. 
By the above observation w(P”, b) 1 w(P 7 a), so b E B(P’) as well. Repeating the 
argument we can find c E A with 
cDom((m - 1)/m, P”)b, 
and so forth. Since A is finite, this process establishes the existence of a cycle in the 
relation Dom((m - 1)/m, P”). As 
Core((m - 1 j/m, P”) # 0, 
thus cycle consists of less than m candidates. The intersection of less than m subsets 
of V, each having cardinality at least ((m - l)/m)l VI, is necessarily non-empty. 
Hence there is a cycle in P’ for some ZE V, which is absurd. 
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6. Three remarks and an open problem 
Remark 6.1. On strtzbegic voting. The classical problem in the theory of strategic 
voting was to find a voting rule with the following property: voting one’s true 
preference is always in one’s best interest, when the alternative available actions are 
voting any other preference. The Participation Axiom also requires that voting 
one’s true preference always be in one’s best interest, but here the unique alternative 
action is aostention. An important aspect of this comparison concerns strategic 
complexity: while it may be difficult for the voter to search for a profitable alter- 
native action in the classical setup, the voter needs to check only one alternative in 
the PA setup. There is a significant difference in the results obtained with the two 
approaches. The classical problem turned out to have a negative solution: with 3 or 
more candidates, no “democratic” voting rule has the desired property (Gibbard 
[2], Satterthwaite [4]). The results on PA indicate that it is a demanding axiom, but 
there do exist democratic voting rules that satisfy it, notably the plurality and Borda 
rules. Finally, it is arguable that a more realistic analysis should incorporate both 
types of strategic behavior-casting an insincere vote and not casting any vote. We 
feel however that the effect of insincere voting would overshadow that of abstention 
in such a framework. 
Remark 6.2. On the critical quota. Special majority quotas were originally in- 
troduced in an attempt o avoid the cycles that occur in the simple majority com- 
parisons when there are more than 2 candidates. This goal is obtained-namely 
Core(q, P’) # 0 for all PVe p-if and only if q > (m - 1)/m. Our result here reveals 
that (m - 1)/m is also the critical quota for reconciling PA and qCC. This suggests 
the following interpretation. As long as Core(q, - ) is non-empty valued it admits a 
selection ice enough to satisfy PA; but when it assumes both non-empty and empty 
values, there is no way to select from its non-empty values and extend the definition 
to ail of 9 without violating PA. The validity of this insight is limited however by 
the fact that it does not account for the discrepancy in the results when q= 
(m-1)/m or when m=3 and q-3. ~1. in these cases Core(q,PV) may be empty, yet 
PA and qCC are consistent. 
Remark 6.3. On the number of voters. One may want to replace the infinite set of 
potential voters in our formulation by a finite set of cardinality n. The consistency 
statement in Theorem 2.1 would of course carry over, but what about the incon- 
sistency statement? For given m and q, it is clear from our proof in Section 4 that 
some finite n suffices. Incidentally, Moulin’s result for q = + requires n 125 and our 
example case with m =4, q=$ (the midpoint of the inconsistency interval) works 
for nz 36. Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that for a given mz4 and a given 
compact KC [+, (m - 1)/m) there exists a finite n that makes PA and qCC inconsis- 
tent for all q EK. Yet, no finite n will yield the result for all qrz [+, (m - 1)/m). To 
see this, observe that given n there exists q< (m - 1)/m such that Dom(q, PV) coin- 
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ctdes with Dom((m - l)/m,PV) whenever 1 VI sn, so the consistency of PA and 
((m - l)/m)CC can be invoked to obtain a contradiction. 
Open Problem. There is an alternative way to apply Condorcet’s principle to quotas 
higher than 3. Namely, for a given qE(+, 11, a voting rule f satisfies the q- 
Dommance Condltron (qDC) if for all P”E B and all a E A 
aDom(q, P”)b for all ~)EA \ {a} * f(P”) = a. 
Clearly qDC is weaker than qCC, and qDC implies q’DC for q’ >q (which is not 
the case for qCC). The conjunction /\q,,,2 q DC amounts to the classical Con- 
dorcet principle, which is #CC. 
The open problem is, given m 14, to determine the range of quotas q for which 
PA and qDC are consistent. In particular, we do not know whether this range is 
strictly larger than the corresponding one for qCC, i.e., qr(m- 1)/m. In our at- 
tempts at this problem we succeeded only to show that PA and qDC are inconsistent 
for values of q which are relatively close to 4. The reader may observe that for our 
proof of inconsistency in Section 4 it suffices to assume that f(P”) E Core(q, P”) 
when the latter is a singleton, which is weaker than qCC but still stronger than qDC. 
An interesting way to look at this problem, as well as other related problems, is 
in terms of colorings of a simplex. Let 
,..., xmr)~lRm’:xk~O,k= l,...,m!, C xk= 1 
k=l I 
be the standard (m! - I)-dimensional simplex, with its vertices ul, u2, . . . . vmc cor- 
responding in a one-to-one fixed manner to the orders 9, P2, . . . , Pm, of the set A 
of m elements. A coloring is a function f : A + A I It is acceptable if for all XE d and 
all k= 1 , .,. , m ! the whole interval [x, uk] is colored with colors ranked at least as 
high as f(x) in the order Pk. (This corresponds to PA.) Now suppose that a partial 
coloring 1s given: D&d is already colored with a, for each atz A. The question is 




c xk? q for all beA,b#q , atsAg 
k a&b 1 
then this ques -orresponds to the problem of consistency of PA and qDC 
described above. 
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